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Abstract. The conservative wealth-exchange process derived from trade interactions
is modeled as a multiplicative stochastic transference of value, where each interaction
multiplies the wealth of the poorest of the two intervening agents by a random gain
η = (1 + κ), with κ a random return. Analyzing the kinetic equation for the wealth
distribution P (w, t), general properties are derived for arbitrary return distributions
pi(κ). If the geometrical average of the gain is larger than one, i.e. if 〈ln η〉pi > 0,
in the long time limit a nontrivial equilibrium wealth distribution P (w) is attained.
Whenever 〈ln η〉pi < 0, on the other hand, Wealth Condensation occurs, meaning that
a single agent gets the whole wealth in the long run. This concentration phenomenon
happens even if the average return 〈κ〉pi of the poor agent is positive. In the stable
phase, P (w) behaves as w(T−1) for w → 0, and we find T exactly. This exponent is
nonzero in the stable phase but goes to zero on approach to the condensation interface.
The exact wealth distribution can be obtained analytically for the particular case of
Kelly betting, and it turns out to be an exponential P (w) = e−w. We show, however,
that our model is never reversible, no matter what pi(κ) is. In the condensing phase,
the wealth of an agent with relative rank x is found to be w(x, t) ∼ ext〈ln η〉pi for finite
times t. The wealth distribution is consequently P (w) ∼ 1/w for finite times, while all
wealth ends up in the hands of the richest agent for large times. Numerical simulations
are carried out, and found to satisfactorily compare with the above mentioned analytic
results.
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1. Multiplicative Trade model
The pervasive existence of inequalities in the distribution of wealth in human societies
has puzzled observers since long, but only recently became a focus of research by
physicists [1]. The observation of a power-law distribution for wealth and income in
capitalist societies, originally made by Pareto [2], has been confirmed and perfected
analyzing extensive sets of data that are nowadays available. These show that the
upper five to ten percent of richest individuals follow a power-law, while the middle
to low income sector of a population follow a Gibbs or lognormal law [3, 1, 4]. The
range of typical wealth variation may be orders of magnitude larger than the natural
variability in individual abilities and capacities, in case one would attempt to resort
to these in order to explain the former. Clearly, it is of interest to understand what
mechanisms may drive the appearance of such startling differences. Apart from the fact
that wealthier individuals or entities have, on average, more political power to influence
their social environment to their advantage, thus producing a self-reinforcing inequality
cascade, it is also valid to ask oneself whether the microscopic mechanisms of wealth
production and redistribution carry within themselves the property of spontaneously
producing inequality.
In a pioneering work [5], Angle proposed the use of conservative wealth exchange models
in order to explain wealth inequalities. He envisaged the wealth exchange process as a
stochastic transfer of “surplus”, in which the looser transfers a random fraction κ of its
wealth to the winner. This is nowadays called the “looser scheme” since it is a fraction
of the looser’s wealth what is at stake [6]. If both interacting agents are assumed to win
with the same probability, then such a process avoids wealth concentration by favoring
the poorest agent, because he risks to loose less than he can win. Aiming to understand
the observed wealth concentration, Angle then argues that the richer agent, because of
the competitive advantage allowed by his larger wealth, usually has a larger probability
of winning in each encounter. Therefore, in the context of Angle’s initial proposal,
wealth concentration is a consequence of an explicit advantage, or edge favoring the
richer agent §.
Although being richer does provide an advantage in the context of certain wealth
appropriation processes, it is now recognized [7, 8] that, from a statistical point of
view, an explicit advantage favoring the rich is not a necessary ingredient for wealth
concentration to happen. This is a remarkable result that only recently has been
stressed in the Econophysics literature. For certain realistic wealth exchange rules to
be discussed in this work, in the long run all wealth may end up in the hands of just
one agent, even if the poor agent has an edge over the rich one. The key ingredient
for this rather counterintuitive phenomenon is the fact that the amount at stake in
each transaction is a fraction of the poorest agent’s wealth [6, 7, 9, 10, 8], not of the
looser’s wealth. This apparently minor difference in the rules of these so-called “poorest
scheme” models profoundly alters the outcome, as now the poor agent has to be given
§ An agent is said to have an edge when the expectation value of a single trade favors him.
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an explicit advantage in order to avoid a catastrophic concentration of wealth called
Wealth Condensation. In other words, multiplicative stochastic transfer whose scale is
dictated by the wealth of the poorest intervening agent implies a “hidden” bias in favor
of the rich. This is one of the statistical factors driving wealth concentration.
On the other hand, it can be generally argued that stochastic multiplicative “poorest
scheme” transfer rules constitute an appropriate simple model of the wealth exchange
process occurring during commercial interaction, or trade [7, 10]. Wealth transfer occurs
in a trade operation not because money changes hands, which is not necessarily always
the case, but as a consequence of the difference in values between the items swapped.
This confers the interaction a clear stochastic character, as none of the agents is perfectly
aware of the true values of the items being interchanged. Furthermore, it can be argued
that the amount at stake must be proportional to the wealth of the poorest agent,
since an interaction in which the richest agent has the possibility to loose orders of
magnitude more than he can win cannot be considered realistic if one wishes to reproduce
a consensual trade process [7, 10].
In this work, an analytic and numerical study is presented of wealth exchange models
in which the transference is stochastic, multiplicative and proportional to the poorest
agent’s wealth. In each interaction, the poor agent risks a fraction κ of its wealth,
where κ is a random variable called the return. Scafetta, Picozzi and West [10] have
numerically studied a model of this type in which the return distribution depends on
the wealths of both intervening agents. In order to simplify the derivation of analytic
results, we restrict ourselves to the case in which the distribution or returns π(κ) is the
same for all pairs of agents.
Section 2 presents the model and a fast heuristic determination of its condensation
interface. In Section 3, the kinetic equation for P (w) is introduced and analytic results
are drawn from it. These are compared with numerical results in Section 4. Section 5
presents a discussion of our results.
2. Trading with an arbitrary distribution of returns
2.1. The model
Trade interactions are modeled as a process in which wealth is stochastically transferred
between a pair of agents, according to the following rules. In each transaction a pair of
agents is chosen at random and the poorest one, initially with wealth wpoor, receives a
gain κwpoor, where −1 < κ < 1 is a random return with distribution π(κ). The richest
agent’s wealth changes by −κwpoor. The transaction is thus conservative, and given by{
wpoort+1 = w
poor
t + w
poor
t κt
wricht+1 = w
rich
t − w
poor
t κt.
(1)
The condition |κ| < 1 ensures that both agents have positive wealth after the trade.
Yard-Sale [7, 11, 9, 8] is a particular case of this process that can be described as a “bet”
for a fraction f of the wealth of the poorest agent, and where the poorest agent has a
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probability p to win. Therefore κ = +f with probability p and κ = −f with probability
q = (1− p), so πYS(κ) = pδ(κ− f) + qδ(κ+ f).
2.2. Wealth Condensation
Depending on π(κ), long term evolution under rules (1) may give rise either to a stable
wealth distribution P (w) or to wealth condensation [8]. The surface consisting of
distributions π(κ) separating these two cases is called condensation interface. We now
derive the location of this interface as follows: Consider an agent who has become so
poor that, in most subsequent trades he will be the poorest. His own wealth will thus
almost always evolve according to
wt+1 = wt(1 + κt), (2)
i.e. it will undergo a Random Multiplicative Process [12] with multiplier ηt = (1+κt) at
each timestep. After a large number N of timesteps, the appropriate central tendency
estimator for its wealth is therefore not the arithmetic average
〈wN〉π = w0 〈1 + κ〉
N
π , (3)
but the geometric average
e〈lnwN 〉pi = w0 e
N〈ln(1+κ)〉
pi , (4)
Clearly the wealth of a poor agent will diminish steadily if 〈ln (1 + κ)〉π < 0, in which
case there is a sustained transference of wealth from poorer to richer agents, the system
is in a condensing phase, and the whole wealth ends up in the hands of one agent in
the long run [8]. This catastrophic collapse of the wealth distribution is called wealth
condensation. By the heuristic arguments above, the condensation interface is therefore
defined by
< ln(1 + κ) > = 0. (5)
This result will be rederived later in Section 3.3 by means of a rigorous analysis of the
kinetic equation for this process.
3. Kinetic Equation Analysis
3.1. Kinetic Equation in the Stationary Limit
In Appendix A we show that the equilibrium wealth distribution P (w) satisfies
P (w) =
〈
P ( w
1+κ
)P>(
w
1+κ
)
(1 + κ)
+
∫ w
1−κ
0
dvP (v)P (w+ vκ)
〉
π
, (6)
where P>(w) =
∫∞
w P (v)dv is the fraction of agents with wealth above w, and 〈〉π
indicates expectation value with respect to the return distribution π(κ). The first and
second terms on the right hand side of (6) represent the contributions of exchanges with
agents that have a wealth respectively larger and smaller than w. This equation can be
solved exactly only for special cases that we discuss later in Section 3.4. In the general
case, however, useful exact results can still be extracted from it, as described next.
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3.2. Small-wealth limit for P (w)
The small-wealth behavior of the wealth distribution P (w) in the stable phase can be
derived as follows. Assume P (w) ∼ w(T−1) for w → 0. Plug this expression into the
stationary kinetic equation (6), approximate P>(w) ≈ 1 for small w, and notice that
the last integral only contributes higher order terms, to find〈
1
(1 + κ)T
〉
π
= 1. (7)
This result can be rationalized by referring to Kesten processes [13, 14, 15], as discussed
in Section 5. Numerical results to be presented later in Section 4 support the validity
of Eq. (7) in the limit of small wealth.
Numerical simulation (Section 4) shows that, using the value of T resulting from (7),
the entire wealth distribution can be approximated by a gamma-function
P (w) = aw(T−1)e−w/b, (8)
where the normalization conditions on the zeroth and first moments of P (w) fix
a = Γ(T + 1)T/Γ(T )T+1, and b = Γ(T )/Γ(T + 1). Notice, however, that the wealth
distribution (see Figs. 1 and 2) is not exactly given by (8), except in special cases.
3.3. Condensation interface
Equation (7) allows us to determine the location of the condensation interface by the
following rigorous argument. Given that P (w) ∼ w(T−1) for w → 0, the fraction
P<(ǫ) =
∫ ǫ
0 P (v)dv of agents whose wealth is below an arbitrarily small but finite level
ǫ is finite for all T > 0, but diverges as T → 0+. The divergence of P<(ǫ) indicates
that most agents impoverish absolutely, equivalently that all wealth concentrates in the
hands of a few ones. Therefore, the condensation interface is defined by the condition
T → 0+. Now rewrite (7) as < e−T ln (1+κ) >= 1 and expand it in powers of T to obtain
∞∑
r=1
(−1)rT r/r < lnr(1 + κ) > /r = 0. (9)
After eliminating the trivial solution T = 0, we are left with
< ln(1 + κ) > = T
(
∞∑
r=0
(−1)rT r < lnr+2(1 + κ) >
(r + 2)
)
. (10)
Therefore, to lowest order,
T ≈ 2 < ln(1 + κ) > / < ln2(1 + κ) > . (11)
We thus find that the condensation condition T → 0 amounts to 〈ln (1 + κ)〉π = 0, which
is the same as Eq. (5), derived previously by analyzing the typical behavior of a poor
agent’s wealth.
For the case of Yard-Sale, where κ = ±f with probabilities p and q = (1− p), the
condensation interface (5) is given by pc = ln (1/(1− f)) / ln ((1 + f)/(1− f)), a result
that has been verified numerically [8]. Notice that pc > 1/2, i.e. the poor has to be
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given a significant explicit advantage, or edge, in order for condensation not to occur.
For a flat distribution of returns between two limits a < κ < b, on the other hand, the
critical condition for condensation reads
〈ln (η)〉π = ln
(
(1 + b)(1+b)/(1 + a)(1+a)
)
− (b− a) = 0. (12)
Here again, notice that it is possible to have condensation even when the average return
of the poor agent, which is 〈κ〉π = (a+ b)/2, is positive.
3.4. Exponential Solution and Kelly Betting
We now show that, for certain return distributions π(κ), the equilibrium wealth
distribution is exponential. For this we replace P (w) = e−w into (6), and get〈
(e−w
1−κ
1+κ − e−w
1+κ
1−κ + 1)/(1 + κ)
〉
π
= 1, (13)
which is a sufficient condition for the stable wealth distribution to be exponential.
Particularized to w = 0, this condition reduces to 〈1/(1 + κ)〉π = 1, which is just
Eq. (7) in the case T = 1, as appropriate for an exponential distribution. However,
notice that (13) is much more restrictive than just (7) with T = 1, because it has to
be satisfied for all w. Trivially, if two return distributions π1(κ) and π2(κ) satisfy (13),
so does any normalized linear combination of them. Therefore, a meaningful approach
to solving (13) consists in first finding simple return distributions which satisfy it, and
then building more general ones by linear combination. Proposing a binary distribution
π(κ) = pδ(κ− a) + qδ(κ− b), one finds that Eq. (13) is only satisfied if −a = b = f
and, additionally, p = (1 + f)/2, that is
π(f)(κ) =
1 + f
2
δ(κ− f) +
1− f
2
δ(κ+ f) (14)
This return distribution corresponds to Yard-Sale [8] but particularized to the case of
Kelly betting [16, 17], which fixes f = 2p − 1. Possible implications of this result are
explored in Section 5.
3.5. More general return distributions with exponential solutions
An arbitrary superposition of return distributions of the form (14) with different values
of f will also admit an exponential solution for P (w). In other words, for any positive
W(f) normalized in [0, 1] we have that
π(κ) =
∫ 1
0
dfW(f)
{
1 + f
2
δ(κ− f) +
1− f
2
δ(κ+ f)
}
, (15)
which is easily integrated to give
π(κ) =
1 + κ
2
W(|κ|), (16)
satisfies (13), i.e. gives rise to P (w) = e−w in equilibrium.
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3.6. Wealths by rank in the condensing phase
Let wR be the wealths of the N agents ordered by rank R, so that w1 > w2 > . . . > wN .
When an agent with rank R interacts with another agent with rank S, we have
w
(t+1)
R =

 w
(t)
R + κw
(t)
R = w
(t)
R η if R > S
w
(t)
R − κw
(t)
S if R < S,
(17)
Notice that (17) is not valid in general, since it disregards rank changes resulting from
interactions. Its validity is restricted to the case in which agents keep fairly constant
ranks, i.e. there is no “social mobility”. This holds in the condensed phase, but not in
the stable phase. In the condensed phase, furthermore, one has wS/wR << 1 so that
the interaction with poorer agents can be neglected altogether, to write
ln
(
w
(t+1)
R /w
(t)
R
)
≈
{
ln η if R > S
0 if R < S.
(18)
Averaging over π(κ), over all (N − 1) possible choices of S, and defining the relative
rank r = (R− 1)/(N − 1) so that r = 0 corresponds the richest agent,〈
ln
(
w
(t+1)
R /w
(t)
R
)〉
π
= r 〈ln η〉π ⇒
〈
lnw
(t)
R
〉
π
= rt 〈ln η〉π (19)
The typical value of w(r, t) therefore satisfies
w(r, t) ∼ e−rtφ, (20)
where we have defined φ = −〈ln η〉π > 0. Normalization for a system of N agents with
a total wealth W then results in
w(r, t) = W
(1− e−tφ/N )
(1− e−tφ)
e−rtφ (21)
Now since r = P>(w(r)) we have that P (w) = −1/(∂w(r)/∂r). From (20) we thus
obtain
P (w) ∼
1
w
(22)
The validity of (20) and (22) is verified for uniformly distributed returns in Section 4.
4. Numerical Results
4.1. Stable phase
We first consider the case of Yard-Sale exchange [8], i.e. π(κ) = pδ(κ−f)+(1−p)δ(κ+f).
Eq. (7) amounts in this case to
p
(1 + f)T
+
q
(1− f)T
= 1. (23)
Some particular cases of interest are
T = 0 ⇒ p = pc = − ln (1− f) / ln
(
1 + f
1− f
)
(24)
T = 1 ⇒ p =
1 + f
2
(25)
T = 2 ⇒ p =
1
2
+
3f − f 3
4
(26)
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w
f=0.10
f=0.40
f=0.80
Figure 1. Wealth distribution for multiplicative exchange with binary return
distribution ( Yard-Sale ), with f as indicated in the figures. a) p(f) = (f + 1)/2,
which corresponds to T = 1 according to (25). The full line is e−w. b) p(f) satisfies
(26), for which T = 2 is expected. The full line is a Gamma function (8) with T = 2.
Eq. (24) defines the condensation interface. Its accuracy has been numerically verified
in previous work [8]. Fig. 1a shows wealth distributions for three values of f , where p(f)
is given by (25), and therefore correspond to T = 1, i.e. P (w) should be constant for
w → 0. Notice that all values of f in this figure satisfy P (w) = e−w. This is consistent
with the results derived in Section 3.4, namely that the wealth distribution is exponential
whenever f = 2p− 1 is satisfied. So in this case, for any pair (p, f) satisfying (25) the
wealth distribution is the same. For T = 2, the wealth distribution should approach the
origin as P (w) ∼ w. This is verified by considering the data shown in Fig. 1b, obtained
with p(f) given by (26). However, in this case, notice that the wealth distribution does
depend on f , i.e. the asymptotic exponent T does not determine the whole distribution.
A similar observation holds for the rest of the (f, p) plane: the equilibrium distribution
depends on f on all lines of constant T , except on the line f = 2p− 1, where T = 1 and
P (w) = e−w.
Let us now consider a flat return distribution π(κ) = 1/(b − a) for a ≤ κ ≤ b, where
|a|, |b| ≤ 1. This last condition ensures that the gain η = (1 + κ) lies between zero and
two, and therefore that both agents can always pay. Eq. (7) can be worked out exactly
also in this case, and the result is
(1 + b)(1−T ) − (1 + a)(1−T )
(b− a)(1− T )
= 1 (27)
We consider the following particular cases
T = 0 ⇒ ln
(
(1 + b)(1+b)/(1 + a)(1+a)
)
= b− a (28)
T = 1 ⇒ ln ((1 + b)/(1 + a)) = (b− a) (29)
T = 2 ⇒ (1 + b)(1 + a) = 1. (30)
The condensation interface has been obtained numerically (not shown) and found to be
in accordance with (28). In the case of T = 1, Eq. (29) can be shown to be equivalent
to writing a = log z/(z − 1) − 1 and b = z log z/(z − 1) − 1, where z = e(b−a) is a free
parameter restricted to 1 ≤ z ≤ 4.9215. We have simulated flat return distributions
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w
b=0.25
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b=0.95
Figure 2. Wealth distribution for multiplicative exchange with flat return distribution
between a and b. a) a = log z/(z−1)−1 and b = z log z/(z−1)−1, with z as indicated
in the figure. This corresponds to T = 1, according to Eq. (29) (see text). The full line
is e−w. b) Here a = −b/(1 + b), with b as indicated in the figure. This corresponds to
T = 2, according to Eq. (30). The full line is a Gamma function (8) with T = 2.
with a and b given by the expressions above with several values of z (Fig. 2a), and found
wealth distributions consistent with T = 1 in all cases, i.e. reaching w = 0 as a constant.
Notice that only in the limit z → 1, in which case a, b→ 0, the distribution approaches
an exponential. When T = 2, Eq. (30) amounts to letting a = −b/(1 + b), within the
limits given by 0 ≤ b ≤ 1. Examples are shown in Fig. 2b, where again good accordance
with analytic predictions for the small-wealth exponent is found.
4.2. Condensed phase
We now verify the approximate expression (20), derived in Section 3.6, for the wealth of
an agent with relative rank x in the condensing state. Fig. 3a shows w(x, t) for returns
κ distributed uniformly between −0.1 and +0.1. Therefore 〈ln η〉π = −1.67× 10
−3, and
the system is in the condensing state. The analytic prediction given by (20) is seen in
this case to be acceptable, except perhaps for the very poorest agents. Accordingly,
the wealth distribution P (w) obtained in this condensing state is, as shown in Fig. 3b,
consistent with 1/w as derived in Section 3.6.
5. Discussion
Multiplicative “poorest-scheme” asset-exchange models with an arbitrary return
distribution π(κ) were studied, analyzing the kinetic equation (6). It was shown that the
the whole system’s wealth “condenses” onto one agent whenever 〈ln (1 + κ)〉π < 0. Given
that e〈ln(1+κ)〉pi ≤ eln〈(1+κ)〉pi = 〈(1 + κ)〉π, it is possible to have 〈ln(1 + κ)〉π < 0, and
therefore wealth condensation, even in cases in which the average return 〈κ〉π is positive.
But having a positive average return means, according to (3), that the expectation value
of a poor agent’s wealth grows exponentially in time. The apparent paradox suggested
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P(
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w
Figure 3. a) Wealth w(x, t) of an agent with relative rank x, 2.5 × 104 (plusses),
5 × 104 (crosses), 7.5 × 104 (asterisks) and 105 (squares) timesteps after starting
from an egalitarian distribution. The return κ is distributed uniformly between −0.01
and 0.00, so the system is in a condensing state. The full line indicates the analytic
prediction given by (20). b) Wealth distribution P (w) for this case at time t = 105
(not normalized). The full line is 1/w.
by the fact that poor agents loose wealth steadily despite their average return being
positive is solved by recognizing that the expectation value is not an appropriate central-
tendency estimator when considering multiplicative processes [12]. In other words, while
the exponential growth indicated by (3) would only be realized after averaging over
an enormously large number of repetitions of the multiplicative process, the typical
outcome of one realization follows the geometric average (4), which, in the condensing
phase, decreases exponentially fast in time.
Analyzing the kinetic equation, the small-wealth exponent T of P (w), was found
to be given by Eq. (7). This result can be understood in the context of Kesten
processes [13, 14, 15], as follows. In the stable phase, where 〈ln (1 + κ)〉π > 0, the
inverse wealth z = w−1 of a poor agent undergoes a contractive multiplicative process
z → zξ = z/(1 + κ) due to its interaction with richer agents, with a small additive noise
term given by its almost negligible interaction with poorer agents, as z → z + δz.
Because in the stable phase 〈κ〉π > 0, it follows that 〈δz〉π > 0. The theory of Kesten
processes then ensures that P (z) has a power-law right tail of the form z−(1+T ) with T
satisfying
〈
ξT
〉
π
= 1. By a simple change of variables, our result (7) then follows for
P (w).
In Section 3.4 it was shown that the wealth distribution is exactly exponential when
π(κ) corresponds to Kelly betting [16, 17]. Kelly betting is a gambling strategy devised
to maximize the long-time rate of growth of a bettor’s capital when faced with a set
of risky choices. In its simplest inception, one considers a gambler who is given a
choice between a single risky asset (a bet) and a riskless asset (e.g. deciding not to
bet). Assuming a bet that pays double or nothing, the gambler doubles its stake or
looses it altogether, respectively with probabilities p and q. The bettor can decide
the (fixed) fraction fw of his wealth that will be risked at each time step, while the
rest (1 − f)w is kept in the riskless asset (e.g. cash). His total wealth thus evolves as
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w → ((1− f)w + 2fw) = (1 + f)w if the bet is won, and as w → (1− f)w if the bet is
lost. In other words, the gambler’s gain is η = (1+f) with probability p, and η = (1−f)
with probability q. This is exactly the way in which the wealth of the poorest agent
evolves in Yard-Sale. The only difference is the fact that, in the betting optimization
problem, f and p are not independent parameters, since the gambler wishes to find the
most profitable f for a given p.
The average gain is 〈η〉π = (1 + f)p + (1 − f)q = 1 + (2p − 1)f , which is larger than
one whenever p > 1/2, i.e whenever the edge (2p − 1) is positive. If the bettor were
to maximize 〈η〉π, the recommended strategy would then be choosing f as large as
possible ‖. However, this approach is doomed to fail in the long run, since sooner
or later a loosing bet would produce his absolute ruin. Kelly then proposes that the
most profitable strategy in the long run consists in using the value of f maximizing
the average growth rate G of the gambler’s wealth, defined by w(t) ∼ eGt. The
average growth rate is then given by the average logarithmic gain 〈ln (η)〉π, since a
random multiplicative process typically follows its geometric average. Maximization of
〈ln (η)〉π = p ln (1 + f) + q ln (1− f) with respect to f then results in f
∗ = (2p − 1),
which is the recommendation of Kelly theory for this problem. Equivalently, p =
(1+ f)/2 and q = (1− f)/2, from which we can recognize that (14) describes Yard-Sale
exchange in the case of Kelly betting.
From the discussion above, f ∗ is the fraction at stake that produces the fastest growth
in the wealth of a poor agent, for a given p. However, notice that this is not the value of
f that produces the least density of poor agents in Yard-Sale for a given p. The density
of poor agents in Yard-Sale in equilibrium is minimum in the limit f → 0, for any fixed
p. This conclusion may be reached by noticing that the fraction of poor agents is smaller
the larger T is and analyzing (7) particularized to Yard-Sale, in the limit T →∞.
The link between Kelly betting and an exponential wealth distribution in these
exchange models is intriguing. The Kelly strategy can be restated in the language of
information theory as a way to maximize the rate of transfer of information over a noisy
channel [16]. On the other hand, the exponential distribution P (w) = e−w maximizes the
entropy S = −
∫
P (w) ln (P (w))dw subject to the constraints of constant total wealth∫
wP (w)dw = 1 and number of players
∫
P (w)dw = 1. Of course, there is in principle
no logical relation between extremization of an entropy transfer rate, and maximizing
the total entropy in equilibrium, however the connection seems worth analyzing.
Because the dynamics is conservative, if the microscopic exchange rules are reversible
it can be shown [18] that the equilibrium wealth distribution has to be exponential.
However, the converse is of course not true, i.e. the existence of a stable exponential
solution does not imply reversibility. In fact, multiplicative exchange rules of the
type discussed here usually violate reversibility, since the role of both agents is clearly
different. Nevertheless, it could in principle be the case that, for some specific return
distributions, the general exchange rules considered here were reversible. This in turn
‖ In this context, f > 1 may be acceptable and would mean that the gambler lends money from the
riskless asset for gambling.
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would provide a clearcut explanation for the appearance of an exponential solution.
However, in Appendix B it is shown that this is not the case, i.e. reversibility is
not satisfied for exchange rules of the general type (1), no matter what the return
distribution π(κ) is. Therefore, the wealth distribution in equilibrium is exponential
for return distributions of the form (14), not because of reversibility, but because of
accidental cancellation of asymmetries in the transition rules.
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Appendix A. Kinetic Equation
Consider an interaction between two agents Y and Z with initial wealths y and z,
assuming without loss of generality y < z. The interaction processes contributing to
P˙ (x) are those in which x is the wealth of one of the two interacting agents, either before
or after the interaction. Adopting the shorthand notation Dκ = π(κ)dκ, Dy = P (y)dy,
and Dz = P (z)dz, one has:
(i) The poorest agent Y has a return κ, its wealth thus becoming y(1 + κ) = x. This
contributes with DκDyDzθ(z − y)δ(x− y(1 + κ)).
(ii) The richest agent Z takes part in an exchange where the poorest agent Y has
return κ. Z’s wealth becomes z − κy = x. The contribution of this process is
DκDyDzθ(z − y)δ(x− z + yκ).
(iii) Either agent has wealth x before the interaction, but not after it, resulting in a
contribution −DκDyDzθ(z − y)(δ(x− y) + δ(x− z)).
If r is the probability per unit time of a trade, the time derivative of P (x) is then given
by
r−1P˙ (x) =
∫
DκDyDzθ(z − y) {δ(x− y(1 + κ)) + δ(x− z + yκ)
−δ(x− z)− δ(x− y)} . (A.1)
Letting P>(x) =
∫∞
x P (z)dz, we are left with
1
r
P˙ (x) = −P (x) +
∫ 1
−1
Dκ
{
P ( x
1+κ
)P>(
x
1+κ
)
1 + κ
+
∫ x
1−κ
0
dyP (y)P (x+ yκ)
}
(A.2)
It can be seen that this equation conserves the zeroth- and first-moments of P (w),
i.e. number of agents and total wealth are conserved.
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Appendix B. Reversibility
We wish to determine whether the exchange rules considered in this work satisfy
reversibility for some return distribution π(κ). For this purpose we have to write the
kinetic equation in the general form
P˙ (x) =
∫
dzdρ
{
P (x− ρ)P (z)W(x−ρ,z)→(x,z−ρ)
−P (x)P (z − ρ)W(x,z−ρ)→(x−ρ,z)
}
, (B.1)
and check whether W(x−ρ,z)→(x,z−ρ) =W(x,z−ρ)→(x−ρ,z) is satisfied. A lengthy but
straightforward calculation shows that
W(x−ρ,z)→(x,z−ρ) = θ(z − (x− ρ))
1
x− ρ
π(
ρ
(x− ρ)
) +
θ((x− ρ)− z)
1
z
π(−
ρ
z
).
W(x,z−ρ)→(x−ρ,z) = θ((z − ρ)− x)
1
x
π(−
ρ
x
) +
θ(x− (z − ρ))
z
(z − ρ)2
π(
ρ
(z − ρ)
). (B.2)
If reversibility holds, the following conditions must then be met:

z > x+ |ρ|, ⇒ 1
x−ρ
π( ρ
(x−ρ)
) = 1
x
π(− ρ
x
),
|z − x| < ρ, ⇒ 1
x−ρ
π( ρ
(x−ρ)
) = z
(z−ρ)2
π( ρ
(z−ρ)
),
ρ < |z − x|, ⇒ 1
z
π(−ρ
z
) = 1
x
π(− ρ
x
),
z < x− |ρ|, ⇒ 1
z
π(−ρ
z
) = z
(z−ρ)2
π( ρ
(z−ρ)
).
(B.3)
The first condition is independent of z, so it has to hold for all x and ρ. By calling
ρ/(x− ρ) = κ and after some manipulation, this condition reads
π(−κ) =
1
1− κ
π(
κ
1− κ
). (B.4)
Similar manipulation of the fourth case gives
π(−κ) =
1
(1− κ)2
π(
κ
1− κ
). (B.5)
These are only compatible with each other if κ = 0. Therefore the exchange rules
discussed in this work are never reversible.
Multiplicative Asset Exchange with Arbitrary Return Distributions 14
[1] Yarlagadda S. Chatterjee, A. and B. K. Chakrabarti, editors. Econophysics of Wealth
Distributions. Springer-Verlag, Milan, Italy, 2005.
[2] V. Pareto. Cours d’Economie Politique. Droz, Geneve, 1896.
[3] A. Chatterjee, B. K. Chakrabarti, and S. S. Manna. Money in gas-like markets: Gibbs and pareto
laws. Phys. Scr., T106:36–38, 2003.
[4] V. M. Yakovenko and J. B. Rosser. Colloquium: Statistical mechanics of money, wealth, and
income. Rev. Mod. Phys., 81:1703–1725, 2009.
[5] J. Angle. The surplus theory of social stratification and the size distribution of personal wealth.
Social Forces, 2:293–326, 1986.
[6] S. Ispolatov, P. L. Krapivsky, and S. Redner. Wealth distributions in asset exchange models. Eur.
Phys. J. B, 2:267–276, 1998.
[7] B. Hayes. Follow the money. Am. Scientist, 90:400–405, 2002.
[8] C. F. Moukarzel, S. Goncalves, J. R. Iglesias, M. Rodriguez-Achach, and R. Huerta-Quintanilla.
Wealth condensation in a multiplicative random asset exchange model. Eur. Phys. J.-Spec.
Top., 143:75–79, 2007.
[9] J. R. Iglesias, S. Goncalves, G. Abramson, and J. L. Vega. Correlation between risk aversion and
wealth distribution. Physica A, 342:186–192, 2004.
[10] N. Scafetta, S. Picozzi, and B. J. West. A trade-investment model for distribution of wealth.
Physica D, 193:338–352, 2004.
[11] S. Sinha. Stochastic maps, wealth distribution in random asset exchange models and the marginal
utility of relative wealth. Phys. Scr., T106:59–64, 2003.
[12] S. Redner. Random multiplicative processes - an elementary tutorial. Am. J. Phys., 58(3):267,
March 1990.
[13] M. Levy and S. Solomon. Power laws are logarithmic boltzmann laws. Int. J. Mod. Phys. C-Phys.
Comput., 7:595–601, 1996.
[14] H Takayasu, AH Sato, and M Takayasu. Stable infinite variance fluctuations in randomly amplified
langevin systems. Phys. Rev. Lett., 79(6):966, AUG 11 1997.
[15] Sornette, D. Multiplicative processes and power laws. Phys. Rev. E, 57(4):4811, April 1998.
[16] J. L. Kelly. A new interpretation of information rate. Bell Syst Tech J, 35:917–926, 1956.
[17] L. M. Rotando and E. O. Thorp. The kelly criterion and the stock-market. Am. Math. Mon.,
99:922–931, 1992.
[18] A. Dragulescu and V. M. Yakovenko. Statistical mechanics of money. Eur. Phys. J. B, 17:723–729,
2000.
